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 Market Reaction to Actual Daily Share Repurchases in Greece 
 
Abstract 
Using a unique, hand-collected data set of actual daily share repurchases from the Athens Stock 
Exchange, we examine the stock market reaction around the disclosure date of actual share 
repurchases, the factors that affect the size of that reaction, and the motives behind share 
acquisitions.  We find that different firms proceed to actual repurchases for different reasons: the 
results for the small firms and the firms with high book-to-market ratio repurchases are 
consistent with the signaling undervaluation hypothesis, while the results for the large firms and 
firms with low book-to-market ratio are in line with the price support hypothesis. In contrast to 
other studies, we find that long-term abnormal returns are higher for repurchasing firms 
compared to non-repurchasing controls and depend positively on the frequency of repurchases. 
 
JEL Classification: G14, G15, G35 
Keywords: Actual share repurchases, market reaction, firm characteristics, stated repurchase 
reasons, price support hypothesis 
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1. Introduction 
Open-market share repurchases worldwide are characterized by two distinct stages: in the first 
stage, the firm authorizes a share repurchase program (SRP), and in the second stage, the firm 
can proceed to the implementation of the program. Depending on the disclosure regulations of 
the country, a public announcement may follow the SRP authorization and the actual repurchases 
made. The literature regarding the first stage has been voluminous and has examined issues such 
as the firm’s motives, the market reaction to SRP announcements, and the economic 
explanations of repurchases, among others.
1
 In contrast, the literature regarding the open-market 
SRP implementation stage is rather thin, largely depending on the availability of transaction data. 
Any explanation of the firm’s behavior in the first stage may not necessarily be 
applicable to the second stage. For instance, a firm may be motivated by undervaluation 
considerations when initiating an SRP. However, in the lengthy implementation period that 
follows, it may proceed to actual repurchases motivated by different goals (Cook et al., 2004), 
such as an arising opportunity to lower its acquisition cost, or a necessity to protect the long-term 
shareholders’ wealth in a declining market. The firm’s repurchasing pattern reveals much about 
the firm’s financial strength and intentions, and we expect the market to react to the disclosure of 
any relevant information. 
Regarding SRP implementations in the US market, Stephens and Weisbach (1998) find 
that share repurchases are negatively related to prior stock price performance, and that 
repurchases are positively related to the firm’s cash flow. Using voluntarily disclosed data for 64 
firms’ repurchase programs, Cook et al. (2004) find no clear evidence about market timing. 
Starting in 2004, US firms were required to disclose detailed information about their repurchase 
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activity in their quarterly financial reports. Capitalizing on this requirement, Ben-Rephael et al. 
(2014) find that firms repurchase at discount prices compared to market prices, and that 
repurchases are followed by a positive and significant abnormal return later, at the time of 
company earnings announcements. Dittmar and Field (2015) find that repurchasing firms pay a 
lower than average price, and that the stock of infrequent repurchasers exhibits a higher long-run 
return.  
Regarding SRP implementations in foreign markets, Brockman and Chung (2001) and 
Zhang (2005) study the Hong Kong capital market, where firms are required to disclose 
repurchase details no later than the next trading day. Brockman and Chung (2001) find that 
managers acquire shares at a lower cost than a naive accumulation strategy, a result consistent 
with either timing based on insider information, or price support. In contrast, Zhang (2005), 
using a novel estimation technique by retaining in the sample only the first daily announcement 
in a sequence of multiple repurchase announcements within a month, finds evidence consistent 
with price support. In addition, the market reaction is positive for small firms and firms with high 
book-to-market ratio, which are more likely to be underpriced. Finally, Zhang (2005) finds no 
long-run effect of actual repurchases on stock returns.  
Ginglinger and Hamon (2007) focus on the French market in the 2000-2002 period, with 
regulation rules requiring firms to disclose monthly detailed information about their repurchase 
activity. They find that repurchases have a negative effect on liquidity and generally reflect 
contrarian trading rather than market timing.  McNally et al. (2006) find that firms have superior 
timing ability, using monthly repurchase data from Canada. 
Akyol and Foo (2013) connect the two SRP stages, by matching the daily announced 
repurchase trades of the firms to the company-stated motives for undertaking the respective 
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repurchase program. The undervaluation motive is shown to be a strong signal, because the firms 
stating an undervaluation motive exhibit more positive abnormal returns upon the announcement 
of their actual trades, and fare better than their controls one year after the repurchases.   
In the aforementioned literature, there is a general consensus about the beneficial effect 
of the firm’s actual repurchase activity, but there are differences regarding stock returns in the 
short- and the long-run, and differences regarding the explanations of the firm’s behavior. The 
differences might be attributed to firm characteristics, to the methodology used, or to the 
institutional factors characterizing each market. One such institutional factor might be the 
disclosure requirement. In the Greek stock market, which is the focus of our paper, and for the 
period we are studying, firms disclose their repurchases within seven trading days. Compared to 
the institutional setting of other published studies on actual share repurchases, the Greek 
disclosure requirement is different from the daily requirement of Hong-Kong (Brockman and 
Chung, 2001) or Australia (Akyol and Foo, 2013), and the monthly requirement of France in the 
2000-2002 period (Ginglinger and Hamon, 2007). Because the institutional setting is different 
from other countries, an empirical study of the Greek market would allow us to understand 
further these controversies. 
The present study uses a unique database of hand-collected data from the Athens Stock 
Exchange regarding open-market repurchases and covering the period from August 2005 to 
December 2010. During this period, immediately after the European Union directive on insider 
trading and market abuse (2003/6/EU) was incorporated in the Greek law, the companies were 
required to disclose their daily transactions on share repurchases no later than seven trading days. 
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To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to gauge the firms’ daily repurchasing 
behavior in Europe after the passage of the new directive.
2
  
Furthermore, we employ a rich data set of 7,619 announcements of actual share 
repurchases, which enables us to draw reliable conclusions regarding the repurchase activity of 
firms and the reaction of investors.  Hence, our study contributes much needed evidence to the 
non-US literature on actual daily share repurchases.  
Overall, we find that companies engage in buybacks when the stock price exhibits a 
declining trend, and that the short-term market reaction is not statistically significant, a result that 
is consistent with the price support hypothesis (Cook et al., 2004; Zhang, 2005, Ginglinger and 
Hamon, 2007; Akyol and Foo, 2013).  
However, when we focus on firm characteristics, we find that smaller firms and firms 
with a higher book-to-market ratio repurchase shares without having observed significant 
fluctuations in the period preceding the buybacks. For this group of firms, the short-term investor 
reaction is positive and statistically significant, consistent with the hypothesis that the firm is 
signaling undervaluation. In contrast, larger firms and firms with a lower book-to-market ratio 
repurchase shares after periods in which the stock price has been in a declining course, and, after 
the share acquisitions, a price stabilization takes place, in line with the price support hypothesis. 
This result agrees with Zhang (2005).  
Regarding repurchase characteristics, when there is a short interval between 
announcements or when the percentage of shares bought back is low, the results confirm the 
price support hypothesis, and when the percentage of share bought back is high, the findings are 
in line with the hypothesis that the firm is signaling undervaluation.  
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The stated reason for authorizing an SRP is related to share price movements before and 
after the actual repurchase as follows: firms which state that their stock is undervalued as a 
reason for approving an SRP, receive a positive reaction by the market when they proceed with 
the implementation of the SRP. Firms that avoid mentioning a specific reason for approving 
SRPs exhibit a pattern of pre- and post-repurchase returns that is consistent with the hypothesis 
that the firm is using stock buybacks as a means of stopping the declining trend of their share 
price. 
In contrast to the literature of actual share buybacks, such as Zhang (2005) and Akyol and 
Foo (2013), we find a strong long-term abnormal return for firms that conduct repurchases. This 
is consistent with the notion that managers have successfully used repurchases to add value for 
their long-term shareholders. This phenomenon may have been accentuated by the market’s 
underreaction to the actual share repurchase announcement, which leads to a positive long-term 
drift in stock returns (Ikenberry et al., 1995). In addition, we find that the long-run return of these 
firms is positively related to the frequency of actual repurchases and negatively related to book-
to-market ratios. 
This paper examines three possible motivations of firms when conducting actual 
repurchases, namely, market timing, supporting the stock price, and signaling undervaluation, the 
first two being most common in the aforementioned literature on actual repurchases and the third 
one being the most common explanation in repurchases in general. Of course, we realize there 
may be other motivations for repurchasing firms, which, however, are outside the scope of the 
present study. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The theoretical framework and the 
hypotheses to be tested are presented in the next section. Section 3 describes the disclosure 
requirement and the data. The empirical results are shown in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Hypothesis development  
2.1. Short-term share price performance 
When a firm approves an open-market SRP, it is not obligated to complete it. Moreover, if the 
firm decides to implement the program, management has a wide spectrum of short-term, value-
adding actions to benefit the shareholders or itself (through performance-related pay or stock 
ownership). These actions can have motivations which can only be uncovered by the firm’s 
actual repurchase behavior and can be quite different from the motivations at the SRP initiation 
stage. Managers can time the market, provide liquidity to curb a downward trend of the firm’s 
stock price, or even give a signal to the investors that the stock is undervalued. We examine if 
the actual repurchase pattern is consistent with any of these three motivations.  
Market timing, or managerial timing ability, is a term that refers to the acquisition of own 
shares when the stock price is at low levels. The purpose is to exploit the current stock price 
fluctuations for the benefit of the long-term investors, provided that the market is not 
characterized by strong form efficiency (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). 
A fundamental question related to stock buybacks is to what extend the executives use 
their private information to proceed with stock repurchases (Barclay and Smith, 1988). 
Brockman and Chung (2001) use daily data from the Hong Kong stock market and find that 
executives possess a market timing ability which depends on the market conditions and the 
special characteristics of the firm. In the same vein, using monthly data from Japan, Ishikawa 
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and Takahashi (2011) find that firms acquire their own shares if their stock price has followed a 
declining trend during the previous month, and that the stock returns of firms actually 
repurchasing shares exceeds the market return during the ensuing months.  
The market timing hypothesis implies that the market price of the stock will be lower 
during the dates of conducting share repurchases in comparison to the subsequent days. The 
study by De Cesari et al. (2012) for the USA finds that indeed the companies seem to possess the 
ability to time the market and succeed in acquiring their own shares at a relatively low price. In 
addition, they find that during the month before the share acquisitions, the stock price follows a 
declining trend and a negative abnormal return is observed, whereas after the repurchase, a 
positive abnormal return is observed. Ben-Rephael et al. (2014) and Dittmar and Field (2015) 
also find results consistent with the market timing hypothesis.  
H1: Negative abnormal returns are observed before the actual share repurchases in the 
open market and positive abnormal returns are observed after the share repurchases.  
According to the price support hypothesis, share repurchases are conducted by a 
company to stem a declining trend in the stock price. The main difference with the market timing 
hypothesis is that, a stabilization of stock prices is expected after the share repurchase, whereas 
in the case of the market timing hypothesis, a positive abnormal return is expected.   
Ginglinger and Hamon (2007) study the French market and find that companies proceed 
to stock buybacks following periods of declining stock prices, but they do not observe a 
significant price increase after the repurchase. The results are consistent with the price support 
hypothesis. Similar results are found by Cook et al. (2004) for the shares that are traded at the 
New York Stock Exchange.  
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H2: Negative abnormal returns are observed in the period before a share repurchase 
occurs and no abnormal returns are observed during the period after the repurchase.  
The signaling undervaluation hypothesis has been popular in the SRP initiation literature 
and suggests that managers are using share repurchases to signal “their disagreement with how 
the market is pricing existing public information” (Grullon and Ikenberry, 2000). Regarding its 
manifestation in the actual repurchase stage, it differs from the market timing hypothesis in that, 
for the period before the repurchase, the stock price is not necessarily on a declining path, i.e., 
the firm does not trade against the market (Zhang, 2005).  
In the studies of Zhang (2005) and Akyol and Foo (2013), even though the 
undervaluation hypothesis is not explicitly addressed, the results are in accordance with this 
hypothesis. Zhang (2005) finds that the market reaction is positive for small and firms with high 
book-to-market ratio, which are more likely to be underpriced. Akyol and Foo (2013) report that 
for firms that state undervaluation as the motive for initiating a share repurchase program, the 
price reaction is positive when those firms proceed to the actual buybacks. The abnormal return 
for the ten-day period before the repurchase is not statistically significant for the undervaluation 
motive firms.  
H3: Firms conduct repurchases regardless of the preceding share price trend, and the 
market reacts positively to the actual share repurchase announcements. 
 
2.2. Company characteristics and repurchase behavior 
Several studies find that companies with different characteristics exhibit different behavior 
regarding share repurchase activities and the market reaction is also different.  Ikenberry et al. 
(1995) examine announcements of SRPs (irrespective of whether the shares were eventually 
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bought back) and find that, in the short-run, the market reaction is more favorable to SRP 
announcements by companies of smaller size. Examining tender offer share repurchase 
announcements in the US, Nohel and Tarhan (1998) find significantly higher post-repurchase 
returns for low-Tobin’s-q firms compared to high-Tobin’s-q firms. Cook et al. (2004) use 
voluntarily disclosed daily data, to find that the larger companies proceed to buybacks after 
periods in which the stock price exhibits a downward trend, whereas for the smaller companies 
no such result is observed. Jagannathan and Stephens (2003) argue that frequent buybacks are 
driven by different motives than infrequent buybacks. The specific characteristics we focus on 
are size and B/M.  
H4: The firm size and the Β/Μ ratio are related to the share price pattern around the 
actual share repurchase announcements.  
 
2.3. Stated reasons for approving stock repurchase programs 
At the SRP initiation stage, and depending on repurchase regulations, firms can state the reason 
for approving a repurchase program, and an interesting question is whether the firm’s statements 
have any informational content for the investors. Otchere and Ross (2002) examine a sample of 
announcements of SRPs for which the stated reason for their approval is share undervaluation. 
These announcements are treated as a positive signal by the investors, and the market reacts 
favorably for the companies that approve SRPs. Such reaction is smaller, although positive for 
rival companies in the same industry, a fact that is consistent with the undervaluation hypothesis. 
Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) find that at the announcement of SRP approval, the market reaction 
is stronger for firms that state undervaluation as the motive for the approval.  
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An even more interesting question is whether the firm’s statements have any value for 
investors during the program implementation. Using daily data from Australia, Akyol and Foo 
(2013) conclude that for companies which announce as a reason for initiating an SRP the fact 
that the stock is underpriced, the investors reaction is positive and stronger compared to the 
companies that announce a different reason for SRP approval. This observation holds both for 
the announcement date of the SRPs and for the dates of the actual repurchases. In addition, 
companies which mention their stock underpricing as a reason for approving repurchases 
eventually buy back fewer shares in relation to companies which state a different reason for SRP 
approval, while daily repurchases do not seem to occur as a response to the stock price trend.  
H5: The stated reason for approving an SRP affects the market reaction around the actual 
share repurchase announcements.  
 
3. Disclosure requirements and share repurchase data 
In Greece, an open-market SRP must be authorized by the shareholders’ General Meeting, which 
defines the maximum number of shares that can be purchased, the duration of the SRP and the 
maximum and minimum price that can be paid. Α firm may repurchase up to 10% of its 
outstanding shares, and certain conditions for trading are imposed: At the date of the actual 
buyback, the repurchase price cannot be higher than the price of the last trade or the highest 
current bid. The company cannot repurchase more than 25% of the average daily volume of the 
shares. The average daily volume figure is based either on the daily volume traded in the month 
preceding the month of public disclosure of that program, or the daily volume traded in the 20 
trading days preceding the date of purchase. In cases of extremely low liquidity, a firm may 
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repurchase up to 50% of the average daily volume, provided that both the stock market authority 
and the investors are informed in advance, as per European Regulation No. 2273/2003.  
The shares bought back can be resold at the discretion of the board of directors, but not 
concurrently with an ongoing SRP. Any remaining shares must be distributed to the employees 
or cancelled within three years with a decision of the general meeting. Beginning in 2007, the 
maximum duration of the programs changed from twelve to twenty-four months. The key 
information about the repurchase programs that is available to the investors in the program 
announcement includes: The date of the general meeting, the maximum number of shares to be 
repurchased, the duration of the program, and the reason for initiating a repurchase program 
(Drousia et al., 2018). 
Until June 2005, companies disclosed their share repurchase activity in irregular intervals 
of a few months up to one year. Starting in July 2005, when the Market Abuse Directive 
2003/6/EU was implemented with the Greek Law 3340/2005, repurchasing companies have been 
treated as insiders with privileged information, and their daily share repurchase activity should 
be posted on the Daily Official List of the Athens Stock Exchange by the end of the seventh 
trading session from the actual share repurchase. The key available information about the 
companies’ daily repurchase activity includes: The date of the actual repurchase, the date of the 
announcement of the repurchase, the number of repurchased shares, and the average share price 
paid.  
Capitalizing on this transparency of the Greek stock market, we construct a unique, hand-
collected dataset including public announcements of companies whose stocks trade on the 
Athens Stock Exchange. The data concerning the repurchase programs and the daily open-
market share repurchase activity are hand-collected from the Daily Official List of the Athens 
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Stock Exchange. The rest of the data such as stock price, firm size (market value of equity) and 
book-to-market ratio are obtained from Thomson Reuters DataStream and Thomson Reuters 
WorldScope. 
Table 1 reports the share repurchase activity in Greece from August 2005 to December 
2010. We obtain 7,619 announcements of actual share repurchases, made by 74 firms under 120 
program authorizations. The total repurchase dates are 9,664, because an announcement may 
contain information about more than one repurchase-day. A factor that differentiates the present 
paper from other studies about actual share repurchases is that the number of the announcements 
and the number of repurchase days do not coincide (Panel A).  
To include an announcement in the study, we require that the number of shares that are 
bought and the average price are reported daily. Several announcements are excluded because: i) 
the company had preferred shares as well as common shares at the date of the SRP authorization; 
ii) they contained buybacks for two to seven days but did not report the number of shares or the 
average price for every day separately, and iii) they were made later (not immediately) and is 
considered very likely that investors had already been informed by another source, such as the 
Internet or a newspaper. Other reasons for excluding announcements are repetition of the 
purchase date and incomplete information. To eliminate extreme observations, announcements 
that contained buybacks for more than seven trading days or are made after a reverse split (which 
changed significantly the number and the price of the company’s traded shares) are not included 
in the study. Panel B of Table 1 reports in detail the number of announcements that are excluded. 
The final dataset includes 7,463 announcements of actual share repurchases, made by 69 firms 
under 109 program authorizations (Panel C). 
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The aim of this study is to examine the price performance surrounding the 
announcements of actual share repurchases as well as long-term. It is obvious that the number of 
announcements is quite large for the study period. In Panel D, we observe that most firms (53%) 
made more than fifty announcements. The percentage of firms that announced more than a 
hundred daily transactions is 33%. Throughout the period under consideration two firms made 
only one announcement, while one firm made 558 announcements. To avoid undue weighting of 
firms and clustering problems we follow the approach of Zhang (2005), that is, when a firm 
makes multiple repurchase announcements within a month, only the first announcement is 
included in the final sample. Using this approach, we end up with 826 announcements of actual 
share repurchases, which represent the event days of the study. 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
Panel A of Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the 826 announcements of the final 
sample. Quartile rankings are determined relative to all firms that are listed on the Athens Stock 
Exchange on the day of the actual share buyback announcement. Small firms and firms with 
higher book-to-market ratio (B/M) have made less repurchase announcements, while larger firms 
report more repurchase days during the study period. In 2008, the number of repurchase 
announcements almost tripled from the previous year, as the stock exchange index dropped to 
lower levels following the onset of the global financial crisis. Panel B of Table 2 reports the 
number of trading days per announcement. The announcements that report more than one 
repurchase-day are about 23.5% of the dataset. In other words, the disclosure requirement in the 
present study is different from the next-day requirement of Hong-Kong (Brockman and Chung, 
2001) or Australia (Akyol and Foo, 2006), and the monthly requirement of France in the 2000-
2002 period (Ginglinger and Hamon, 2007). 
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We proceed with the estimation of the short-term market reaction surrounding the actual 
share repurchase announcements. 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
 
4. Empirical evidence 
4.1. Short-term market reaction  
We use the standard event study methodology to estimate the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) 
around the announcements of actual daily share repurchases. The market model is used as the 
benchmark model, with an estimation period ranging from 200 to 21 days before the 
announcement (−200, −21) and an event window that starts 120 trading days before the date of 
the announcement and ends 20 days after the announcement (−120, +20). The market returns are 
based on the General Index of the Athens Stock Exchange. The event day (day “0”) is the day of 
the actual share repurchase announcement at the Daily Official List of the Athens Stock 
Exchange. To determine statistical significance of the mean CARs, we use the Patell Z-test.  
Table 3 reports the average cumulative abnormal return around the announcements of 
actual share repurchases. The windows (−120, −1), (−60, −1), (−20, −1) and (−10, −1) are used 
to examine whether firms tend to repurchase when the stock price underperforms the market. 
Repurchasing when the stock price follows a downward trend is consistent with both the market 
timing and the price support hypothesis. The window (0, +1) aims to capture the effect of the 
initial announcement. The windows (+2, +10) and (+2, +20) are used to examine the short-term 
market reaction after the announcement day, approximately one calendar month.  
The results for the full sample (Panel A of Table 3) suggest that companies buy shares 
after intervals where the stock price shows a downward trend. The immediate response is not 
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statistically significant. In the period immediately after the announcement, i.e., event window 
(+2, +10), investors show a slightly positive reaction that gradually disappears. Between (+2, 
+20), the reaction is not statistically different from zero. The results are consistent with the price 
support hypothesis (H2) rather than the market timing hypothesis (H1), and agree with 
Ginglinger and Hamon (2007).  
The next section examines whether and how some company and repurchase characteristic 
affect the company repurchase decision and the market reaction. 
(Insert Table 3 here) 
 
4.2.  Share price performance related to company and repurchase characteristics 
Various studies suggest that company characteristics affect the company repurchase activity as 
well as the investors’ reaction. Dittmar (2000) argues that different firms proceed to buybacks 
for different reasons. Ikenberry et al. (1995, 2000) find that companies with higher book-to-
market ratio report higher long-term abnormal return after the announcement of SRP 
authorizations. Furthermore, the market reacts more favorably to buyback announcements of 
smaller companies. Cook et al. (2004) observe that larger firms repurchase after periods when 
the price of the stock underperforms the market.  
 We proceed with the examination of the company characteristics. In Panel B of Table 3 
the announcements are grouped according to firm size and B/M ratio. The firm size is estimated 
as the market value of equity. Quartile rankings are computed using all listed firms on the Athens 
Stock Exchange on the day of the actual share repurchase announcement. 
Overall, the results suggest that smaller firms and firms with higher B/M ratio (whose 
shares are likely to be undervalued) repurchase shares even though the share price has not 
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experienced any abnormal change in the period preceding the announcement. Investors short-
term reaction is positive and statistically significant. Larger firms and firms with lower B/M ratio 
repurchase shares after intervals when the shock price follows a declining path. Following the 
share buyback, we observe a stabilization of prices. Thus, the results for smaller firms and firms 
with higher B/M ratio are in accordance with the signaling undervaluation hypothesis (H3). The 
results for the larger firms and firms with lower B/M ratio are consistent with the price support 
hypothesis (H2). Furthermore, these results are confirmed by the significance for the difference 
between mean CARs in the subsamples. This is corroborated by Figures 1 and 2, which shows 
the cumulative average abnormal return for the 41-day period surrounding the announcement 
date (−20, +20) according to size quartile and B/M ratio quartile, respectively. Overall, we 
conclude that hypothesis H4 holds. The findings are similar to those of Zhang (2005).  
In Panel C of Table 3 the data are grouped according to repurchase characteristics. 
Following the methodology of Zhang (2005) we used three variables: a) the number of days that 
elapse between the actual share repurchase announcement under consideration and the 
immediately preceding announcement of the company within a year period, b) the number of 
company announcements in the quarter preceding the current announcement, and c) the 
percentage of shares acquired over the number of outstanding shares. The first two variables 
estimate the degree of “surprise” of the actual share repurchase announcement, that is, whether it 
was expected or unexpected by investors. The announcements are divided into two categories 
with cut-off point the median of each distribution, i.e., 3 days and 13 announcements, 
respectively. The third variable is an estimate of the signal’s strength. In this case the 
announcements are divided into two equal subsets. 
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When the actual share repurchase announcements are frequent (either the interval 
between the announcements is less than 3 days or the number of announcements is greater than 
13 during the preceding three months), the initial reaction is not statistically significant, which is 
somehow expected. For the cases where the number of days since the previous announcement 
and the repurchase size are small, we observe a negative and statistically significant abnormal 
return in the twenty trading days preceding the event day. The CAR(+2, +20) is not statistically 
significant. The results are in accordance with the price support hypothesis. For the cases where 
the number of announcements is small in the quarter before the event day, the findings are 
consistent with the market timing hypothesis. For the cases where the repurchase size is high, the 
results support the signaling undervaluation hypothesis. However, the results are not confirmed 
by the test for the difference between mean CARs in the subsamples. 
(Insert Figure 1 here) 
(Insert Figure 2 here) 
 
4.3. Share price performance related to the reason for program authorization 
In Greece companies are required to announce the reason for initiating an SRP at the date of the 
program authorization. The most common reason for authorization, as stated by the companies, 
is stock undervaluation. For a large percentage of programs, the reason is not explicitly stated 
(the company just states that the acquisitions will be conducted in accordance to the existing 
laws). Few programs fall into a third category, with various causes of approval, for example, the 
cancellation of shares to reduce its share capital, sell-back to the market, distribution to 
employees or a combination of these reasons.  
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Using the categorization mentioned above, we examine the market reaction to 
announcements of actual share repurchases. The evidence in Table 4 indicates that the short-term 
market reaction is greater when the firm-stated reason for authorizing a SRP is to support the 
stock price in case of undervaluation. When the reason is not explicitly stated, the CAR for the 
preceding period is negative and statistically significant, while the short-term CAR(+2, +20) is 
not statistically significant. The results are consistent with the price support hypothesis. When 
the reason is very specific but other than stock undervaluation, it appears that the information is 
already incorporated in the share price and there is no statistically significant reaction. Therefore, 
there is evidence that hypothesis H5 holds.  
(Insert Table 4 here) 
 
4.4. Factors affecting the market reaction 
Cross-sectional regression analysis is used, to examine whether and to what extent some 
characteristics of companies and announcements affect the market reaction to actual share 
repurchase announcements. Following Zhang (2005), we regress the initial market reaction, 
CAR(0, +1), the immediate short-term reaction, CAR(+2, +10), and a month after the 
announcement, CAR(+2, +20), on firm and repurchase characteristics. 
Table 5 reports summary statistics for the variables we use in our regression analysis. 
“Firm size” is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity and “B/M” is the book-to-
market ratio, both measured on the day of the actual share repurchase announcement. “CAR(−20, 
−1)” denotes the abnormal return for the month before the announcement. “NDLR” is the 
number of days since the last repurchase announcement of the company and estimates the time 
between the actual share repurchase announcement under consideration and the previous one, 
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within a year. “NAP3M” is the number of the company’s announcements during the preceding 3 
months, calculated by the announcements made within the last 90 days before the event day 
under examination. The variables “NDLR” and “NAP3M” are determined based on Zhang's 
(2005) methodology. “NTDA” is the number of trading days included in the actual share 
repurchase announcement and reports the trading days that the firms acquired shares and are 
disclosed on the same day. “Repurchase size” is the percentage of repurchased shares relative to 
shares outstanding. We also include dummy variables for the three different groups of stated 
reasons for SRP authorization: stock undervaluation, not specific reason, and stated reason other 
than stock undervaluation. Because the coefficients of the dummy variables are not statistically 
significant in any case, they are not further reported. In addition, to reduce the influence of 
extreme values, the variables are formed by winsorizing at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles.  
(Insert Table 5 here) 
Table 6 shows the results of three main regression models with the method of ordinary 
least squares (OLS). We control for year fixed effects in all models, and standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level. We observe that the coefficient of the B/M ratio is positive, a finding 
that supports the signaling undervaluation hypothesis. Also, the investors reaction is negatively 
related to the number of announcements in the previous quarter, a result that is different from 
Zhang (2005). Interestingly, the coefficient of the abnormal performance in the period before the 
announcement is positive and statistically significant only in the period (+2, +10). 
(Insert Table 6 here) 
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4.5. Long-term price performance 
To examine whether managers successfully exploit stock undervaluation, Ikenberry et al. (1995, 
2000) find that, after announcing SRP authorizations, firms exhibit strong abnormal long-term 
returns, and that this result is more pronounced in firms with higher book-to-market ratio. 
Regarding actual daily share repurchases, Akyol and Foo (2013) and Zhang (2005) do not find 
significant long-term abnormal returns for repurchasing firms compared to a matching sample of 
non-repurchasing firms. However, Zhang (2005) finds that firms with high book-to-market ratio 
perform better in the long-term.  
In our analysis so far, we assume that the market is efficient in incorporating the publicly 
available information in the actual share repurchase announcements. If this is not the case, it is 
likely that the market will correct its short-term misreaction in a longer horizon. We examine 
long-term returns to see if investors revise their expectations upward following actual share 
repurchases. We follow the methodology of Barber and Lyon (1997) and compare one-, two- and 
three-year buy-and-hold returns (BHRs) against a control sample, using monthly data.
3
 The firms 
in the control sample are selected by first requiring the matching firm to have a market value 
between 70% and 130% of the repurchasing firm in the same calendar year, and then selecting 
the firm with the closest B/M ratio to that of the repurchasing firm.  
As shown in Panel A of Table 7, the repurchasing firms outperform the control firms for 
all periods. The negative return signs are a result of the falling equity market especially after 
2007. The buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) are 11.57%, 18.1% and 29.18% for the one-, 
two-, and three-year holding periods and significantly different from zero at the 1% level. This is 
consistent with the notion that managers have successfully used repurchases to support the stock 
                                                          
3
 Thus, our total data coverage extends to 2013, three years beyond the announcements period. 
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price to add value for their shareholders. The high long-run returns phenomenon may have been 
accentuated by the market’s underreaction to the actual share repurchase announcement, which 
leads to a positive long-term drift in stock returns (Ikenberry et al., 1995). In any case, the result 
is different from Akyol and Foo (2013) and Zhang (2005), who do not find significant long-term 
abnormal returns for repurchasing firms.  
Further examination of the BHARs by size quantile in Panel B of Table 7, the 
repurchasing firms exhibit statistically significant buy-and-hold abnormal returns, especially the 
smaller ones. Furthermore, considering the B/M characteristics of the firms, we observe that the 
BHARs for repurchasing firms are positive and most of them are significant at the 1% level. The 
firms with the highest B/M ratios (quartile 1 and 2), seem to perform better than control firms, 
especially in three-year holding horizons, and this result agrees with Zhang (2015).  
Regarding the relationship between announcement reasons and long-term returns, all the 
stated reasons for conducting a repurchase are positively related to BHARs, as shown in Table 8.  
However, when the company’s reason for conducting a repurchase is specified in the 
announcement and it is different from stock undervaluation, the repurchasing firms seem to 
exhibit the strongest long-term abnormal performance.  
The three-year BHARs are regressed against several variables, as shown in Table 9. We 
conclude that the B/M variable is negatively related to BHARs, as expected. In addition, the 
number of repurchases made during the preceding three-month period (NAP3M) is positive and 
statistically significant. In other words, frequent repurchasers seem to be characterized by high 
long-term price performance.  
Insert Table 7 here. 
Insert Table 8 here. 
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Insert Table 9 here. 
 
4.6. Robustness tests 
We perform various sensitivity tests: (1) using alternative estimation periods (−250, −31) and 
(−300, −41); (2) using alternative short-run announcement period return windows such as (−1, 
+1) and (−2, +2); (3) winsorizing the returns at the 1st and 99th or 5th and 95th percentiles to 
control for outliers; (4) using other parametric and non-parametric test methods such as the 
standardized cross-sectional test of Boehmer et al. (1991), which accounts for event-induced 
variance, and the rank test of Corrado (1989); and (5) using other benchmark models such as the 
market-adjusted return model, the mean-adjusted return model, and the market model with the 
Scholes-Williams beta estimation method. None of these variations changes our results. 
Akyol and Foo (2013) follow the methodology of Zhang (2005) with a slight variation: 
For the calculation of the variables that assess the degree of “surprise”, they impose a further 
restriction that the announcements are made under the same program. We use the same 
modification to re-estimate the abnormal returns. The results are similar. 
During the period under examination, some firms made only one share repurchase 
announcement. Other firms repurchased almost daily while their SRP was in effect. To examine 
if the Mean CAR has been affected by the companies with the largest number of announcements, 
we conduct the following test. We calculate the average cumulative abnormal return for each 
company separately and then carry out significance tests across firms. The results do not change.  
To ensure that our regression results are robust to the clustering problem, we use 
alternative techniques for estimating standard errors and found similar results. We calculate 
standard errors adapted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation according to Newey and West 
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(1987). Finally, we group the residuals in two dimensions, by company and by day, following 
the two-way technique proposed by Petersen (2009) and Thompson (2011). The coefficients of 
the variables about the stated reasons for SRP authorizations are not statistically significant in 
any model.
4
 
 
5. Conclusions 
Compared to the literature regarding the initiation stage of open-market repurchase programs, the 
literature regarding actual repurchases is very thin and focuses on non-US markets characterized 
by a timely disclosure of buyback transactions. Using an extensive dataset of announcements 
regarding conducted repurchases in the Greek stock market, we examine when companies 
choose to implement their approved SRPs and the investors’ reaction. In addition, we investigate 
how some company characteristics (firm size and book-to-market ratio) and repurchase 
characteristics (frequency and size of repurchases), as well as the preceding mandatory company 
announcement stating the reason for approving an SRP, affect the behavior of companies and 
investors in the short- and the long-term.  
Overall, we find that companies engage in buybacks when the stock price exhibits a 
declining trend, and that the short-term market reaction is not statistically significant, a result that 
is consistent with the price support hypothesis. However, the price pattern around repurchases of 
smaller firms and firms with a higher book-to-market ratio is consistent with the hypothesis that 
the firm is signaling undervaluation. In contrast, larger firms and firms with a lower book-to-
market ratio repurchase shares to stabilize their stock price. Regarding repurchase characteristics, 
when there is a short interval between announcements or when the percentage of shares bought 
                                                          
4
 All robustness tests are available from the authors upon request. 
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back is low, the results confirm the price support hypothesis, and when the percentage of share 
bought back is high, the findings are in line with the hypothesis that the firm is signaling 
undervaluation. 
The company’s stated reason for approving an SRP affects the market reaction at the time 
of actual share repurchases. In contrast to the literature, we find that long-term abnormal returns 
are higher for repurchasing firms compared to non-repurchasing controls and depend positively 
on the frequency of repurchases. 
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Figure 1 
Mean CAR of firms according to size quartile (Q1: Small, Q4: Large) in the window 
(−20, +20).  Day “0” on the horizontal axis is the date of the announcement of the 
actual share repurchases. 
 
 
Figure 2 
Mean CAR of firms according to B/M ratio quartile (Q1: High, Q4: Low) in the 
window (−20, +20).  Day “0” on the horizontal axis is the date of the announcement 
of the actual share repurchases. 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics of daily share repurchases in Greece from August 2005 
to December 2010 
Panel A:  Full dataset  
Number of firms 74 
Number of program authorizations 120 
Number of repurchase announcements 7,619 
Number of repurchase days 9,664 
Total number of shares repurchased 276,627,699 
Value of repurchased shares (in euro) 1,946,269,573 
Average repurchase days (per firm) 131 
Average repurchase announcements (per firm) 103 
Panel Β:  Reason for excluding announcements  
Preference shares 87 
The number of shares or the average price is not known for 
every day separately 42 
Late announcements 1 
Repetition of repurchase date 9 
Missing information 2 
The announcement reported more than seven trading days 10 
Reverse split 5 
Panel C:  Dataset after excluding the announcements in Panel B 
Number of firms 69 
Number of program authorizations 109 
Number of repurchase announcements 7,463 
Number of repurchase days 9,065 
Total number of shares repurchased 269,574,548 
Value of repurchased shares (in euro) 1,827,838,405 
Average repurchase days (per firm) 131 
Average repurchase announcements (per firm) 108 
Panel D:  Number of repurchase announcements per firm 
Number of firms with less than 10 repurchase announcements 11 (16%) 
Number of firms with 11-20 repurchase announcements 9 (13%) 
Number of firms with 21-50 repurchase announcements 12 (18%) 
Number of firms with 51-100 repurchase announcements 14 (20%) 
Number of firms with more than 100 repurchase announcements 23 (33%) 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics of open market share repurchases from August 2005 to December 2010 
Panel A: Size and B/M quartiles 
Year Repurchase Size quartile  Book-to-market quartile 
 announcement 1(small) 2 3 4(large)  1(high) 2 3 4(low) 
2005 10 0 7 3 0  0 7 3 0 
2006 49 0 21 14 14  5 22 13 9 
2007 86 2 16 33 35  33 12 17 24 
2008 240 19 70 35 116  50 43 77 70 
2009 230 39 46 57 88  39 110 30 51 
2010 211 16 48 61 86  32 63 65 51 
All 826 76 208 203 339  159 257 205 205 
Panel B: Distribution of repurchase days per announcement 
Repurchase days 
per announcement 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Number of 
announcements  
631  59  37  26  49  21  3  
Percent  76.5 7.1 4.5 3.1 5.9 2.5 0.4 
To avoid undue weighting of firms and clustering problems we follow the approach of Zhang (2005), i.e., when a 
firm makes multiple repurchase announcements within a month, only the first announcement is included in the 
final sample.  
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Table 3 
Abnormal share price performance surrounding announcements of actual share repurchases 
   
Window 
      
  
N (−120,−1)  (−60,−1)  (−20,−1)  (−10,−1)  (0,+1)  (+2,+10)  (+2,+20) 
Panel A: Full sample  
CAR 
 
826 −1.49% −1.10%* −0.95%*** −0.74%*** −0.14% 0.58%** 0.46% 
   
(−1.63 ) (−1.72) (−2.88) (−2.83) (−0.98) (2.05) (0.84) 
Panel B: Announcements grouped by firm characteristics 
1. By size quartile 
CAR 1 (small) 76 −0.03% 2.28% 2.22% 0.16% −0.17% 2.19%* 3.67%** 
 
  
(−0.32) (0.64) (1.21) (0.12) (0.06) (1.77) (2.50) 
CAR 2 208 −1.31% −1.18% −0.62% −0.22% −0.47%* −0.05% 0.01% 
 
  
(−0.48) (−0.30) (−0.59) (−0.12) (−1.89) (−0.15) (0.15) 
CAR 3 203 −0.65% −0.13% −0.98% −0.45% 0.08% 0.77%* 1.10% 
 
  
(−0.43) (−0.23) (−1.33) (−0.71) (0.29) (1.67) (1.17) 
CAR 4 (large) 339 −2.44%* −2.38%*** −1.85%*** −1.44%*** −0.06% 0.50% −0.36% 
   (−1.68) (−2.58) (−3.58) (−3.83) (−0.29) (1.12) (−0.90) 
Difference (Q1−Q4) Mean 2.41% 4.66%** 4.07%** 1.60% −0.11% 1.69%* 4.03%*** 
   [0.88] [2.09] [2.45] [1.29] [−0.19] [1.71]  [2.77] 
2. By B/M quartile 
CAR 1 (high) 159 4.07% 2.54% 1.53% 0.70% 0.56%* 2.15%*** 2.56%** 
  
  
(0.86) (0.99) (0.79) (0.77) (1.88) (2.67) (2.21) 
CAR 2 257 −1.91% −0.18% −0.28% −0.26% −0.22% 0.48%* 0.95%* 
  
  
(−0.85) (0.10) (0.04) (−0.42) (−0.64) (1.70) (1.75) 
CAR 3 205 −3.08% −4.46%*** −2.82%*** −1.44%*** −0.22% −0.39% −1.18%* 
 
  
(−1.37) (−2.93) (−3.64) (−2.66) (−0.56) (−0.87) (−1.78) 
CAR 4 (low) 205 −3.71%* −1.71% −1.84%*** −1.77%*** −0.50%** 0.47% −0.13% 
   
(−1.72) (−1.50) (−2.88) (−3.24) (−2.34) (0.72) (−0.45) 
Difference (Q1−Q4) Mean 7.78%*** 4.25%** 3.37%** 2.47%** 1.06%*** 1.68%* 2.69%** 
   [3.89] [2.24] [2.57] [2.43] [2.76] [1.95] [2.09] 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Panel C: Announcements grouped by repurchase characteristics 
1. By number of days since last repurchase announcement 
CAR ≤ 3 422 −1.61% −0.85% −1.34%*** −1.10%*** −0.11% 0.97%** 0.70% 
 
  
(−1.43) (−1.33) (−2.97) (−3.21) (−0.46) (2.00) (0.52) 
CAR > 3 404 −1.38% −1.35% −0.55% −0.37% −0.17% 0.17% 0.22% 
 
  
(−0.88) (−1.10) (−1.09) (−0.77) (−0.93) (0.89) (0.66) 
Difference (≤ 3) – (> 3) Mean −0.23% 0.50% −0.79% −0.73% 0.06% 0.80% 0.48% 
   [−0.17] [0.42] [−0.97] [−1.19] [0.23] [1.51] [0.61] 
2. By number of announcements during the preceding 3 months 
CAR ≤ 13 416 −2.51% −1.94%* −1.79%*** −1.08%*** −0.15% 1.31%*** 1.38%** 
 
  
(−1.63) (−1.73) (−3.36) (−2.60) (−0.98) (3.70) (2.44) 
CAR > 13 410 −0.46% −0.24% −0.10% −0.40% −0.13% −0.16% −0.47% 
 
  
(−0.68) (−0.71) (−0.71) (−1.40) (−0.40) (−0.82) (−1.27) 
Difference (≤ 13) − (> 13) Mean −2.05% −1.70% −1.69%** −0.68% −0.02% 1.47%*** 1.85%** 
  [−1.57] [−1.43] [−2.06] [−1.10] [−0.10] [2.78] [2.37] 
3. By repurchase size (%) 
CAR low 413 −1.38% −1.24%* −1.18%*** −0.80%** −0.24% 0.26% −0.03% 
 
  
(−1.23) (−1.67) (−2.69) (−2.46) (−1.18) (0.60) (−0.65) 
CAR high 413 −1.61% −0.95% −0.73% −0.68% −0.03% 0.90%** 0.95%* 
   
(−1.08) (−0.76) (−1.38) (−1.54) (−0.20) (2.30) (1.83) 
Difference (low − high) Mean 0.23% −0.29% −0.45% −0.12% −0.21% −0.64% −0.98% 
   [0.17] [−0.24] [−0.55] [−0.19] [−0.82] [−1.20] [−1.25] 
The CARs are measured against the market model with the estimation period from 200 to 21 days before the actual share repurchase 
announcement. The Patell Z-test for the significance of mean CARs is shown in parentheses. Significance for the difference between mean 
CARs is based on the t-test assuming unequal variances (in brackets). The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Τable 4 
Mean CAR grouped by the reason for initiating the SRP, as stated by the company.  
 
Window 
 (−120,−1) (−60,−1) 
(−20,−1) (−10,−1) (0,+1) (+2,+10) (+2,+20) 
1. Stock considered undervalued 
CAR −0.65% 0.82% −0.68% 0.27% 0.08% 1.11%* 1.77%** 
  (−0.11) (0.88) (−0.02) (1.17) (0.29) (1.76) (2.10) 
2. Non-stated reason 
CAR −2.01%* −2.03%*** −1.37%*** −1.20%*** −0.19% 0.65%* 0.52% 
 
(−1.85) (−2.66) (−3.52) (−4.05) (−0.98) (1.71) (0.63) 
3. Stated reason, other than stock undervaluation 
CAR −0.05% 1.20% 0.49% 0.35% −0.09% −0.08% −0.70% 
 
(−0.10) (0.45) (0.15) (0.34) (−0.62) (0.00) (−1.04) 
The CARs are measured against the market model with the estimation period from 200 to 21 days before the actual share repurchase 
announcement. The stated reasons are provided by the company when announcing the SRP initiation. The number of 
announcements is 104, 576 and 146 for the first, second and third category of stated reason, respectively. The Patell Z-test for the 
significance of mean CARs is shown in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 
Descriptive statistics 
 
CAR  
(0,+ 1) 
CAR 
(+2,+10) 
CAR 
(+2,+20) Firm Size B/M 
CAR 
(−20,−1) NDLR NAP3M NTDA 
Repurchase 
size (%) 
Mean −0.001 0.006 0.005 11.667 1.591 −0.01 11.838 21.505 1.642 0.038 
Median −0.003 0.002 0.002 11.161 1.104 −0.011 3 13 1 0.014 
Std. Dev.  0.037 0.076 0.112 1.93 2.441 0.118 25.996 20.02 1.356 0.069 
Min −0.15 −0.474 −0.652 8.53 0.112 −0.69 0 0 1 0 
Max 0.224 0.488 0.409 16.922 16.915 0.409 247 66 7 0.848 
Obs. 826 826 826 826 826 826 826 826 826 826 
The CARs are measured against the market model with the estimation period from 200 to 21 days before the actual share repurchase announcement. “Firm 
size” is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity on the actual share repurchase announcement date. “B/M” is the book-to-market ratio measured on 
the actual share repurchase announcement date. “NDLR” is the number of days since the last repurchase announcement of the company, i.e., the time between 
the actual share repurchase announcement under consideration and the previous one, within a year. “NAP3M” is the number of the company’s announcements 
during the preceding 3 months, calculated by the announcements made within the last 90 days before the event day under examination. “NTDA” is the number 
of trading days included in the actual share repurchase announcement and reports the trading days that the firms acquired shares and are disclosed on the same 
day. “Repurchase size” is the percentage of repurchased shares relative to shares outstanding. 
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Table 6 
Regression results 
 
CAR (0,+1) CAR (+2,+10) CAR (+2,+20) 
Intercept 0.000 0.012 0.086** 
 
(0.01) (0.55) (2.04) 
CAR (−20,−1) −0.021 0.051** 0.046 
 
(−1.22) (1.99) (1.09) 
Firm size  0.001 0.000 −0.004 
 
(0.17) (−0.25) (−1.67) 
B/M 0.001*** 0.002** 0.001 
 
(4.57) (2.08) (0.75) 
NDLR 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(−0.80) (−0.15) (−0.25) 
NAP3M  0.000 −0.001** −0.001** 
 
(0.44) (−2.33) (−2.29) 
NTDA  0.001 −0.001 0.001 
 
(0.57) (−0.51) (0.32) 
Repurchase size  −0.002 0.050 0.034 
 
(−0.14) (1.22) (0.59) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 826 826 826 
Number of firms  69 69 69 
R-squared 0.024 0.027 0.025 
The CARs are measured against the market model with the estimation period from 200 
to 21 days before the actual share repurchase announcement. “Firm size” is measured by 
the natural logarithm of the market value of equity. “B/M” is the book-to-market ratio. 
“NDLR” is the number of days since the last repurchase announcement of the company, 
i.e., the time between the actual share repurchase announcement under consideration 
and the previous one, within a year. “NAP3M” is the number of the company’s 
announcements during the preceding 3 months, calculated by the announcements made 
within the last 90 days before the event day under examination. “NTDA” is the number 
of trading days included in the actual share repurchase announcement and reports the 
trading days that the firms acquired shares and are disclosed on the same day. 
“Repurchase size” is the percentage of repurchased shares relative to shares outstanding. 
t-tests are reported in parentheses. The regressions include year fixed effects. Standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level. The symbols **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 7  
Long-term buy-and-hold abnormal returns following actual share repurchases up to three 
years 
  
1-Year 2-Year 3-Year 
  
N Return N Return N Return 
Panel A: Full sample   
Repurchase firms 
 
701 −9.58% 612 −27.82% 519 −22.81% 
Control firms 
  
−21.15% 
 
−45.92% 
 
−51.99% 
Difference 
  
11.57%*** 
 
18.10%*** 
 
29.18%*** 
t-test 
  
(7.97) 
 
(9.14) 
 
(8.87) 
Panel B: Announcements grouped by firm characteristics       
1. By size quartile 
Repurchase firms 1 (small) 54 −12.83% 36 11.73% 10 49.01% 
Control firms 
  
−27.84% 
 
−37.88% 
 
−70.08% 
Difference 
  
15.01%** 
 
49.61%*** 
 
119.09%** 
t-test 
  
(2.14) 
 
(3.41) 
 
(2.75) 
Repurchase firms 2 175 −14.25% 150 −29.99% 125 −29.68% 
Control firms 
  
−17.41% 
 
−47.08% 
 
−43.88% 
Difference 
  
3.16% 
 
17.09%*** 
 
14.20%** 
t-test 
  
(1.12) 
 
(4.60) 
 
(2.49) 
Repurchase 
firms 3 173 −7.70% 142 −17.28% 127 10.43% 
Control firms 
  
−28.18% 
 
−44.15% 
 
−55.31% 
Difference 
  
20.48%*** 
 
26.87%*** 
 
65.74%*** 
t-test 
  
(7.61) 
 
(6.57) 
 
(7.17) 
Repurchase firms 4 (large) 299 −7.36% 284 −36.95% 257 −38.68% 
Control firms 
  
−18.08% 
 
−47.21% 
 
−53.58% 
Difference 
  
10.72%*** 
 
10.26%*** 
 
14.90%*** 
t-test 
  
(4.99) 
 
(4.14) 
 
(5.10) 
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Table 7 (continued) 
2. By B/M quartile 
Repurchase firms 1 (high) 147 −17.58% 128 −30.73% 95 −28.42% 
Control firms 
  
−27.09% 
 
−44.83% 
 
−59.06% 
Difference 
  
9.51%*** 
 
14.10%*** 
 
30.64%*** 
t-test 
  
(3.27) 
 
(3.71) 
 
(4.71) 
Repurchase firms 2 226 −9.09% 187 −19.40% 171 1.02% 
Control firms 
  
−25.26% 
 
−46.62% 
 
−50.72% 
Difference 
  
16.17%*** 
 
27.22%*** 
 
51.74%*** 
t-test 
  
(5.99) 
 
(7.08) 
 
(6.67) 
Repurchase firms 3 151 −11.82% 132 −28.66% 101 −33.06% 
Control firms 
  
−14.53% 
 
−46.88% 
 
−46.81% 
Difference 
  
2.71% 
 
18.22%*** 
 
13.75%*** 
t-test 
  
(0.87) 
 
(4.07) 
 
(2.96) 
Repurchase firms 4 (low) 177 −1.67% 165 −34.42% 152 −39.29% 
Control firms 
  
−16.64% 
 
−45.20% 
 
−52.43% 
Difference 
  
14.97%*** 
 
10.78%*** 
 
13.14%*** 
t-test     (5.34)   (3.02)   (3.09) 
Long-term returns are measured using the Barber and Lyon (1997) control-firm methodology using monthly data. 
The symbols **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  
38 
 
Table 8  
Long-term buy-and-hold abnormal returns grouped by the reason for initiating the SRP, as 
stated by the company. 
  1-Year 2-Year  3-Year 
  N Return N Return N Return 
1. Stock considered undervalued 
Repurchase firms 84 −5.78% 70 −16.93% 68 −25.45% 
Control firms 
 
−11.76% 
 
−39.14% 
 
−53.76% 
Difference 
 
5.98% 
 
22.21%*** 
 
28.31%*** 
t-test 
 
(1.58) 
 
(3.36) 
 
(3.25) 
2. Non-stated reason 
      Repurchase firms 482 −10.05% 411 −30.52% 345 −26.70% 
Control firms 
 
−20.58% 
 
−44.71% 
 
−47.47% 
Difference 
 
10.53%*** 
 
14.19%*** 
 
20.77%*** 
t-test 
 
(5.89) 
 
(6.15) 
 
(6.47) 
3. Stated reason, other than stock undervaluation 
Repurchase firms 135 −10.28% 131 −25.15% 106 −8.45% 
Control firms 
 
−29.05% 
 
−53.33% 
 
−65.55% 
Difference 
 
18.77%*** 
 
28.18%*** 
 
57.10%*** 
t-test   (5.91)   (6.33)   (5.42) 
Long-term returns are measured using the Barber and Lyon (1997) control-firm methodology using monthly 
data. The stated reasons are provided by the company when announcing the SRP initiation. The symbol *** 
denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 9 
Regression Results 
 
1-Year BHARs 
 
2-Year BHARs 
 
3-Year BHARs 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Intercept 0.307 0.312 0.354 
 
1.109*** 1.143*** 1.189*** 
 
1.716** 1.752** 1.955*** 
 
(1.33) (1.35) (1.59) 
 
(2.71) (2.89) (2.97) 
 
(2.52) (2.54) (2.85) 
CAR (−20,−1) 0.183 0.185 0.181 
 
0.143 0.161 0.133 
 
0.568** 0.593** 0.549* 
 
(1.31) (1.31) (1.28) 
 
(0.78) (0.89) (0.72) 
 
(2.06) (2.12) (1.93) 
Firm size  −0.018 −0.018 −0.016 
 
−0.074** −0.074** −0.068** 
 
−0.122** −0.124** −0.116** 
 
(−1.07) (−1.08) (−0.96) 
 
(−2.46) (−2.59) (−2.37) 
 
(−2.55) (−2.56) (−2.63) 
B/M −0.020 −0.020 −0.023 
 
−0.050** −0.050*** −0.057*** 
 
−0.062* −0.061* −0.087** 
 
(−1.33) (−1.33) (−1.51) 
 
(−2.49) (−2.65) (−2.69) 
 
(−1.86) (−1.87) (−2.23) 
NDLR 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.41) (0.41) (0.46) 
 
(0.61) (0.46) (0.65) 
 
(0.06) (−0.02) (0.08) 
NAP3M  0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 
 
0.004** 0.005** 0.004** 
 
0.009** 0.010** 0.009** 
 
(1.99) (2.01) (2.03) 
 
(2.07) (2.29) (2.11) 
 
(2.13) (2.28) (2.26) 
NTDA  −0.016 −0.024 −0.025 
 
−0.036 −0.076** −0.053* 
 
0.007 −0.032 −0.029 
 
(−0.97) (−1.22) (−1.34) 
 
(−1.52) (−2.20) (−1.91) 
 
(0.25) (−0.69) (−0.74) 
Repurchase size  −0.131 −0.107 −0.185 
 
−0.338 −0.086 −0.404 
 
−1.642 −1.390 −1.786 
 
(−0.28) (−0.22) (−0.38) 
 
(−0.39) (−0.09) (−0.44) 
 
(−1.29) (−0.99) (−1.34) 
Stated reason - 
undervaluation 
 
0.056 
   
0.290* 
   
0.282 
 
  
(0.68) 
   
(1.77) 
   
(1.46) 
 Νon-stated 
reason 
  
−0.077 
   
−0.158* 
   
−0.317* 
   
(−1.30) 
   
(−1.77) 
   
(−1.94) 
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Table 9 (continued) 
 
Obs. 701 701 701 
 
612 612 612 
 
519 519 519 
Number of firms  65 65 65 
 
60 60 60 
 
53 53 53 
R-squared 0.059 0.061 0.067   0.122 0.147 0.141   0.157 0.169 0.190 
Long-term abnormal returns (BHARs) are measured using the Barber and Lyon (1997) control-firm methodology using monthly data. “Firm size” is measured 
by the natural logarithm of the market value of equity. “B/M” is the book-to-market ratio. “NDLR” is the number of days since the last repurchase 
announcement of the company, i.e., the time between the actual share repurchase announcement under consideration and the previous one, within a year. 
“NAP3M” is the number of the company’s announcements during the preceding 3 months, calculated by the  announcements made within the last 90 days 
before the event day under examination. “NTDA” is the number of trading days included in the actual share repurchase announcement and reports the trading 
days that the firms acquired shares and are disclosed on the same day. “Repurchase size” is the percentage of repurchased shares relative to shares outstanding. 
t-tests are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
